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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------
LORNA M. ALDER SOFFE, aka 
LORNA M. ALDER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-------------------
vs. Case No. 17342 
DONALD BIAINE RIDD and 
NANCY M. RIDD, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer case brought by plaintiff-
appellant to obtain possession of real property sold under a 
modified Uniform Real Estate Contract, and with a counterclaim 
seeking to avoid a forfeiture of all monies paid as unconscionable. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants-respondents were granted judgment on their 
counterclaim in the amount of $15,897.19. Appellant's motion for 
a new trial was denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the tr1·a1 · Judge's;, 
•t., 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants are in disagreement with substantial port:i 
the Statement of Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief. 
On March 10, 1978, plaintiff Soffe and defendants Ric 
I entered into a modified Uniform Real Estate Contract where. 
plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to purcha~ei 
home and lot at 1341 East Creek Road, Sandy, Utah, for tnel 
of $57 ,500.00 ( Exh. 1 and Tr. 125). That contract provi,,j 
for a down payment of $16, 500. 00, monthly payments of i11:I 
commencing on April 10, 1978 and continuing thereafter uni 
March 10, 1979, and a balloon payment of no less than irn: 
and no more than $16, 500. 00 on March 10, 1979 ( Exh. l), · 
contract pro<1ided for possession to be deli<1ered to defen:. 
on March 10, 1978, and for interest on the unpaid princit<: 
balance at the rate of nine and one-half (9~%) percent per 
from and after March 10, 1978 ( Exh. 1). The contract was: 
pared by plaintiff who was represented by counsel ( Tr. i;: 
179). Defendants were not represented by counsel duringneJ 
tiations on the contract ( Tr. 178). The property was notl 
and there was no real estate commission ( Tr. 197). ! 
I 
Plal. ntiff pursUllnt :i Defendants made a down payment to 
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the contract in the amount of $16,500.00 (Tr. 126 and 179), 
and thereafter made thirteen consecutive monthly payments to 
plaintiff in the amount of $325.00 each (Tr. 128). Monthly 
payments made by defendants totaled $4,225.00, and all payments 
made by defendants on the contract totaled $20,725.00 ( Tr. 126 
and 128). Defendants were unable and failed to make that balloon 
payment of no less than $10,250.00 due on March 10, 1979 ( Tr. 128) 
Defendants were in possession of the premises at 1341 East 
Creek Road, Sandy, Utah, from March 10, 1978 until June 20, 1979 
(Tr. 127 and 190). The fair rental value of the premises at 1341 
East CreekRoad, Sandy, Utah, during the time of possession by 
defendants was $325.00 per month for fifteen months and ten days 
or a total of $4, 983. 22 ( Tr. 194 and 214 ) . 
The fair market value of the premises at 1341 East Creek 
Road, Sandy, Utah, on March 10, 1978 was $57,500. (Tr. 165 and R. 
30 at Interog. No. 7). On June 20, 1979, the property was in 
better condition and worth substantially more than $57,500.00 
(Tr. 204 and 225). During occupancy the defendants made modest 
improvements which included repainting of the kitchen and family 
room (Tr. 183). After retaking possession of the premises on 
June 20, 1979, plaintiff paid a sewer fee of $5.28(Exh. 6), paid 
the sum of $100.00 for cleaning ( Exh. 5), paid the sum of 
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$7 3. 00 for fire insurance ( Exh. 3), repaired a fence for 
( Tr. 168), and together with her husband, spent additiolli:I 
(found by the Court to be 50 man-hours worth $375.00) it 
cleaning and making repairs to the premises ( E h 7) x • 'In 
addition, plaintiff substantially improved and bettered t[, 
premises by painting of the interior ( Exh. 4) and exteric: 
( Exh. 4) of the home, replacing shrubs ( Tr. 160 and &ch. 
replacing utility room linoleum ( Tr. 158 and Exh. 4), inr 
new carpeting ( Tr. 156 and Exh. 4) and draperies (Tr. lli 
Exh. 4) ,and other miscellaneous work ( Exh. 4). These impr: 
were benefits to the home and premises and resulted in pla1 
the home and premises in better condition than they were ill 
innnediately prior to possession by defendants ( Tr. 167, ;:. 
207 and 219). Prior to the purchase and possession of the' 
by defendants, the landscape shrubbery was 011ergrown ( Tr. 1 
the interior of the home needed paint ( Tr. 154, 181 and 1~i 
the exterior paint was peeling ( Tr. 160, 182 and 222), tni 
linoleum in the utility room was worn ( Tr. 158 and 181), 0 
carpets were worn and showing threads ( Tr. 132, 153, 181,l 
and 218) , and the draperies were dirty and too oid to be c~ 
( Tr. 133, 206, 209 and 218). After making these impro~e¢l 
and placing the premises for sale, plaintiff quoted an ast!1 
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price for theproperty of between $90,500.00 and $91,500.00 
Tr. 167 and 220). 
On or about June 12, 1979, plaintiff filed an unlawful 
detainer action against defendants in the district of the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County ( R. 2). At the commencement 
of trial plaintiff waived any claim for treble damages (Tr. 127). 
In its Memorandum Decision the Trial Court held that plaintiff 
was not entitled to an offset or recoupment for improvements 
to the home and premises which were a benefit and resulted in 
placing the home and premises in better condition than they 
were in immediatelyprior to possession by defendants ( R. 61). 
In its Memorandum Decision the Court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to damages as an offset or recoupment by reason of the 
failure of defendants to make a balloon payment ( R. 61 and 62). 
Said damages were set forth in the Memorandum Decision as follows: 
Title insurance 
Sewer Fee 
Cleaning 
Labor of plaintiff and husband 
Fence repairs 
Fire insurance on home 
Fair rental value during defendants' 
possession 
Total Damages 
$259.00 
5.28 
100.00 
375.00 
100.00 
73.00 
4.983.22 
$5,895.50 ( Tr. 61 &6: 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVID[ 
AND IS CONSISTENT WITH WELL RECOGNIZED CASE IAW. 
A. FORFEITURES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
The parties to this action stipulated that defendan:~ 
$16,500.00 on a real estate contract with a total price( 
$57,500.00 ( Exh. 1 and Tr. 126). Defendants had possess:: 
the property from March 10, 197 8 to June 20, 1979 ( Exh.: 
Tr. 127 and 190). During that time period the defendantsl 
thirteen payments of $325. 00 each or an additional sum oil 
$4, 225. 00 ( Tr. 128) . The total amount paid by defendant;!' 
plaintiff totaled $20, 725. 00 ( Tr. 126 and 128). The ball 
payment of no less than $10, 250. 00 required to be made on 
March 10, 1979 was not paid ( Tr. 128). I 
On June 12, 1979, plaintiff filed this unlawful detal 
action ( R. 2). Defendants counterclaimed for the return:ll 
amounts paid to plaintiff in excess of plaintiff's actual 
damages on the basis of an unconscionable forfeiture ( R~ 
A number of Utah cases ha11e held that a liquidated· 
pro11ision will not be enforced unless it bears some reasr. 
relationship to the actual damages: 
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" This court is committed to the doctrine, that where 
the parties to a contract stipulate the amount of 
liquidated damages that shall be paid in case of 
breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule 
enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not dispro-
portionate to the damages actually sustained ... 
" On the contrary, where enforcement of the for-
feiture provision would allow an unconscionable and 
exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable relation-
ship to the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly 
held it to be unenforceable." 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446, 448, 
449 ( 1952) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
" It is row established in this state that where a 
forfeiture provision allows an unconscionable and 
exorbitant benefit to be retained by the seller 
which bears no relationship to the damages which have 
been sustained or reasonably could have been contem-
plated, it provides for a penalty or punitive damages 
which courts of equity will not enforce." 
Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294, 298 
( 1954) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
"This court has long been committed to the rule that 
parties to a contract may agree as to the amount of 
liquidated damages that shall be paid in the case of 
a breach, that the agreement is enforceable if the 
amount stipulated to is not disproportionate to the 
damages actually sustained. The provision in a contract 
for the sale of real property that all payments which 
have been made will be forfeited as liquidated damages 
will not be enforced if the forfeiture would be 
grossly excessive and disproportionate to any possible 
loss so as to shock the conscience." 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P. 2d 371, 373 ( Utah 1977) 
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I Other cases having declared an unlawful f f ' or eiture :.I 
Kay y. Wood, 549 P. 2d 709 (Utah 1976), and Call'·~ 
Corporation, 567 P. 2d 1108 (Utah 1977). I 
A comparison of facts in those cases and in this ca;: 
reveal that these defendants have been subjected to an un·
1 
I 
conscionable forfeiture. In Perkins IT. Spencer the purck 
paid $2,500.00 down on a $10,500.00 contract. The total-
paid on that contract was $2,725.00. A forfeiturewasdec 
in that case based on a down payment of 23i'. and total~ 
of 25%. The corresponding figures in this case show a d~.:r 
ment of 28% and total payments of 36%. In fact, in noneu' 
heretofore cited cases were the percentages greater tM 
case. Furthermore, judgments have withstood appeal where 
amount involved was much less than in this case. For exa: 
in Jacobson v. Swan, this Court affirmed judgment in fav,: 
the purchaser in the amount of $1,823.38 Similarly, in· 
TimberL_akes Corporation, this Court found a forfeiture i!i 
the total amount paid over a period of three plus years'-
$3, 181. 07 on a $10,000.00 contract. In Kay IJ, Wood the 
purchaser had made a 4% down payment, had occupancy for 
year and was awarded judgment in the amount of $4,663.m. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.l 
"r 
-9-
Plaintiff cites in her brief the case of Strand v. 
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396( 1963), but in so doing 
seriously misstates the facts of that case. A reading of the 
entire decision will show that the purchasers expended 
$28,762.00. However, the purchasers had occupancy for 33 
months and admitted that the motel had a fair rental value of 
$450.00 per month or a total of $14,850.00. The fact which 
plaintiff conveniently neglected to recite shows that the 
original purchasers assigned or sold their buyer's equity to 
a third party, and that they received as consideration a total 
of $15,615.00. Adding the fair rental value for 33 months of 
$14, 850.00 to the amount received upon resale of $15,615.00, 
gives a rental value plus payments received of $30,462.00. In 
the words of this Court on page 398, 11 • • • the payments credited 
and the rental value of the motel property amounts to $30,462.00, 
which is $1, 699. 00 more than they have paid. 11 
In her brief the plaintiff quotes extensively from the 
dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Carman. In doing so the plaintiff 
cites two very old California cases. However, plaintiff has 
failed to look at more recent California cases, and particularly 
the leading case of Freedman v. Rector. Wardens & Vestryman of 
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St. Mathias Parish, 230 P. 2d 629 ( Cal. 1951). I.n the ~.·_1 
case, the California Supreme Court expressly reJected thl 
reasoning of Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co 12} i 
- · • Ca:f 
55 Pac. 713( 1898). It is of significance to note thati:~ 
v. Rector, Ju; tice Traynor, after discussing the basic rf 
issues, relied for his primary authority upon the Utah Cil 
Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 ( 1923), Tu 
Malmberg v. Baugh was the forerunner of Perkins IJ. Spenct 
was cited with approval in the latter case. I 
By citing authorities from states other than Utah, I 
plaintiff would appear to be attempting to create the ii;: 
that Utah follows a minority view or that the trend of· 
against reco11ery. From the authorities we find the oppo1: 
be true. In Osborne Nelson & Whitman Real Estate Financ: 
West Publishing Co., 1979, Section 3.26 at page 80, wer' 
follows: 
" Traditionally, installment land contract forfeitu:< 
pro11isions were routinely enforced in favor of ~e, 
vendor. . . . . While forfeitures are still occas1ona~, 
traditionally enforced, it nevertheless can be safe~ 
stated that in no jurisdiction today will a 1Jendor:. 
able to assume that forfeiture provisions will ~et) 
automatically enforced as written. This change 15. ·f 
result of both legislative and judicial inter1Jent'.0'.. 
. · f t · forfeit· to ameliorate the harsh impact o automa ic , 
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Plaintiff criticizes the rule of Perkins v. Spencer, and 
in so doing compares financing by real estate contract to that 
of mortgages and trust deeds. In this regard it is important to 
note that the foreclosure of mortgages and trust deeds are both 
regulated by statute. In both instances, the vendee is given the 
opportunity to bid at sale and, in effect, pay the entire out-
standing balance. Under a mortgage foreclosure, the mortgagor-
vendee even has a right to redeem after six months. However, 
the forfeiture provision in the subject contract operates as a 
strict foreclosure provision without any opportunity to bid at 
a judicial or public sale. It is important to note in this 
regard that the subject real estate contract had been modified 
so as to expressly prohibit accelerated payments ( Exh. 1). 
Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd testified that he could not obtain 
financing for the payment due on March 10, 1979 because he did 
not hold title to the property, but could have obtained financing 
for the entire outstanding balance (Tr. 202 and 203). He further 
testified that plaintiff would not accept the entire unpaid 
balance ( Tr. 203). 
B. DAMAGE OR LOSS RECOGNIZED AS AN OFFSET. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, this Court stated that, when the 
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I 
contract provision is unenforceable, the rights of the Pi:j1 
should be adjusted by reference to damages ordinarily rec ' 
able. The Court proceeded to set forth the items I ,, .... 
1 
loss to which vendors are entitled: 
"(1) Loss of any advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of theproperty; I 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market vall 
of the property not allowed for items ·1· 
Nos. 1 and 2; and 
(4) For the fair rental value of theproperty durind 
period of occupancy. i 
i 
I 
The total of such sums should be deducted from the:l 
amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it·t~ 
be fair to allow recovery, and any remaining diffen::.
1 
awarded to the plaintiffs" 
243 P. 2d at 451 
An analysis of the claims made by plaintiff will sh1.1 
that they are grossly exaggerated and that they do not er, 
within the purview of damages ordinarily recoverable as" 
forth in Perkins 11. Spencer. 
C. FAIR RENTAL VALUE IS CHARGED ONLY FOR Tl![ 
PERIOD OF OCCUPANCY. 
The plaintiff has attempted to charge the defendantif 
I 
.,__ t th time of t:1.' the fair rental value of tr~property up o e .I 
1 claims rent> I In plaintiff's Brief at page 3 she express Y , 
I 
i 
• 
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" ... for twenty-five months, said time from the date of contract 
until the time of trial. .. ". 
The cases clearly do not permit such a computation. In 
Perkins v. Spencer, this Court clearly specified that the seller's 
loss would include " the fair rental value of the property 
during the period of occupancy." ( emphasis added) In this case 
the defendants were in occupancy for fifteen months and ten days, 
from March 10, 1978 to June 20, 1979 ( Exh. 1, Tr. 126, 127' 
andl90). Similarly, in 1 Summary of Real Proeerty Law, Brigham 
Young University, 1978, at page 305, it is recited that damages 
are to be ascertained by reference to " the fair rental value 
during the period of occupancy. " 
In the case of Johnson v. Carman, this Court did authorize 
the computation of interest in lieu of fair rental value. In 
that case, the interest was computed only during the period of 
occupancy. That decision states, on page 373, that the" 
buyer quit the premises on May 24, 1976". The decision continues 
on the same page to approve and affirm an interest computation 
as follows: 
" Interest on $150,000.00 to May 24, 1976, 
at 812% per annum ...........•..•.. ·· $14,485.00" 
In this case the only evidence of fair rental value during 
the period of occupancy was between $300.00 and $325.00 per 
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month ( Tr. 194 and 214) . Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd te 
that in his opinion the fair rental value was between t 
and $325.00 (Tr. 194). Mark B. Stephens, an expert appral 
called on behalf of the defendants, testified that the r,I 
··~: 
rental value of the subject property during 
occupancy by the defendants was $325.00 per 
the period oi . i 
man th ( Tr. 1:.: 
The plaintiff did testify that the fair rental value of fr 
at the time of trial was $400. 00 to $450. 00 per month (I: 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision, expressly foi:r:I 
fair rental value to be $325. 00 per month ( R. 61). 
D. INTEREST IN LIEU OF FAIR RENTAL VALUE. 
As previously indicated, the case of Johnson v. Cami: 
permitted the use of interest in lieu of fair rental ~alu1 
However, this interest cannot be added to the fair rental 
Furthermore, a careful reading of Johnson v. Carman will ,J 
that interest w8' computed on the unpaid balance of th< '1 
at the rate specified in the contract. The method by whicti 
· · t was l interest was computed and a clear explanation that l 1 
i 
in lieu of fair rental value is found on page 374: 
" Here, though, instead of using what may have been 
a speculative fair market value, seller was gran~~ 
interest on the unpaid balance of the contract. 
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8~% per annum rate used was one agreed upon by the 
parties in the contract." (Emphasis added) 
572 P. 2d at 374 
The use of interest in this case in lieu of fair rental 
value will not appreciably alter the result. The parties 
intentionally set the monthly payments of $325.00 to cover 
interest accruing on the unpaid balance. Consequently, if 
interest was computed on the unpaid balance of $41,000.00 at 
the rate of 9~% per annum from March 10, 1978 to June 20, 1979, 
the total would be $ 4,976.94, as compated to rental of $4,983.22. 
In violation of the principles set forth in Johnson v. 
Carman. the plaintiff has computed the interest to be $9,800.00 
(Tr. 228). An amount that great can be computed only by charging 
interest on the full contract price from the possession date to 
the date of trial, and this is clearly contrary ·to the law set 
forth in Johnson v. Carman. 
E. DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY IS LIMITED TO THE 
COST OF RESTORING THE PROPERTY TO ITS ORIGINAL 
CONDITION. 
In this case the plaintiff has submitted considerable cost 
data in an apparent attempt to show the cost of restoration. 
However, the cost data submitted by plaintiffs is primarily for 
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materials and labor in making substantial improvements L 
subject property. The trial court specifically found in::. 
Memorandum Decision that " ... the painting and linole\llll,· 
'! 
the carpeting which was placed in the home greatly benefi:.: 
its present 1Talue ... " and that the defendants were not tc 
charged with such impro1Tements ( R. 61). On appeal the pl~ 
continues in an effort to charge the defendants with the:j 
I 
cost of those impro1Tements. At trial the plaintiff madHi 
effort to specify an amount which would restore the propd 
I 
its original condition, but freely admitted that the prorii 
was then ( at the time of trial) 
first occupied by the defendants 
in better condition than1· 
because of the new carpe: 
I 
paint, etc.: 
"O. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
In your opinion is the property at the presen: 
in better condition than it was when the Rid61 
I 
moiled in? I 
Oh, Yes. 
Would it be in much better condition? . I 
Well, new carpeting, new paint jobs inside ai.r 
out, in three rooms, that is" 
( Tr. 167) 
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This improvement of the property,as distinguished from a 
restoration to its original condition, was clearly not con-
templated in the authorities. The rule previously set forth 
from Perkins y. Spencer specifies that the seller can offset 
" any damage to ... " the property. In Johnson v. Carman, this 
Court affirmed the off set of an amount determined as the " reason-
able cost to restore premises". ( Emphasis added) 
It should not take any further citation of authority to 
understand that the plaintiff cannot charge the defendants 
with the expense of placing the property in better condition than 
it was in originally. Nevertheless, because of plaintiff's 
testimony, the following citations are given: 
" Damages arising from temporary injury to land may be 
measured by different standards, depending on the 
varying circumstances of each particular case. Where 
the injury to real property is merely temporary, or 
where the property can be restored to its original 
condition, the measure of damages can be, or should 
include, the cost of repairs or restoration, as where 
the injury is susceptible of remedy at a moderate or 
reasonable expense and the cost of restoration may be 
shown with reasonable certainty, or where the cost of 
restoration is less than the diminution in the value of 
the property. This is particularly true where the 
adop~ion of the difference in value as the measure of 
damages would be difficult and uncertain, or where the 
injury is not so much to the land itself as to improve-
ments thereon. The recovery is limited to the cost of 
restoring the premises to their original condition. and 
does not extend to that of placing them in better 
condition than there were in originally. 
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"The cost of restoration, however cannot be ad ' 
' opte I 
as the measure of damages where the cost of restori: th~ ~roperty ~o~ld exceed the value thereof in its ·1 
original condition, or the depreciation in the vab 
thereof, or the actual damage sustained by plaint':. 
or where restoration is impracticable." ( Emphasi:·;j 
25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 84. ·1 
***************************** 
"One of the two rules of damages used most often in! 
measuring recovery for injury to a building or 
structure is the cost of restoring that building or. 
structure to its condition irmnediately prior to the i 
injury." (Emphasis added ) 
22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 140. 
******************************* 
"One group of cases measures damages by the value of ' 
the fixture in its condition at the time of removal 
or destruction. These cases value the fixtures asa 
part of the real estate and not at its second hand r 
A second group of cases holds that the measure of' 
for wrongful injury to or removal of fixtures is the 
cost of repairs or the cost of restoring the propert; 
to its condition irmnediately prior to the wrongful«: 
( Emphasis added). 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 1.:, 
In this case the plaintiff submitted cost data for rri~ 
and labor in making substantial improvements on the subjeii 
property. This brief will not discuss each and every itd 
only those inoolving the greater expense. It is sub•itt"·! 
ever, that most other items ( except those approved by the: 
I 
court in its Memorandum Decision )ire in this same categor:I 
improvements. In considering these items it should be not'·. 
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the original portion of the home was built in approximately 
1911 ( Tr. 152). 
The largest item is for the interior and exterior paint. 
The testimony is undisputed that the exterior of the home was 
badly in need of paint at the time defendants took possession 
(Tr. 160, 182 and 222). Mrs. Soffe admitted on cross examination 
that, at the time defendants took possession, the exterior paint 
was peeling ( Tr. 152 and 160) and that paint was needed in the 
living room Tr. 154). 
Another major item is the new carpet placed in the living 
room, dining room and small bedroom. Again, the evidence is 
undisputed that the existing carpet was worn to the point of 
showing threads ( Tr. 132, 153, 181, 206, and 218). The plaintiff's 
son, Dr. Alder, testified that he had seen threads in the carpet 
prior to possession by the defendants (Tr. 132), and the 
plaintiff herself testified that there could have been threads 
or jute showing ( Tr. 153 and 154). Plaintiff further testified 
that the new carpeting was better than the carpet existing prior 
to possession by the defendants ( Tr. 156). There was also 
testimony that the carpet in place at the time defendants took 
possession was at least 18 years old( Tr. 219). 
Another major item is the draperies. There was a dispute 
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in the testimony as to whether the original draperi· ' es wer. 
wa-shable, but Dr. Alder conceded that the drapes were not 
(Tr. 133). Defendants' witnesses, including an experienc;i 
dry-cleaner, testified that the draperies were dirty and:l 
not withstand cleaning ( Tr. 206, 209, and 218). Furthet 
testimony was undisputed that the drapes were stored in J 
basement and were still available when plaintiff retook 
possession ( Tr. 159 and 187). Plaintiff now seeks to charj 
' 
the defendants with the cost of new draperies in the livir 
and family rooms ( Brief at p. 3 and Exh. 4). 
A th ·t · h 1. 1 · h ·1· I no er l. em is t e new ino eum in t e uti ity rooi. 
Plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants with the cost of· 
placing new linoleum ( Brief at p. 3 andExh. 4). However, 
I 
on cross examination plaintiff admitted that the linole\lll~ 
the utility room was worn before the defendants m01ed in 
( Tr. 158) . Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd gave a more thori1 
description of the utility room floor upon taking occupanc: 
"The floor in the utility room was spongy because of 
the leak at some point in time that had continueddt~ 
leak on that spot causing the floor to rot out an )!' 
was no asbestos tile on that part of the floor at a· 
( Tr. 181) 
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The plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants with the 
purchase of some 12 to 15 shrubs ( Brief at p. 3, Tr. 160 and 
Exh. 5). Dr. Alder testified on cross examinatbn that the 
existing shrubs were overgrown at the time defendants took 
possession (Tr. 134). Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd testified 
that he pruned one shrub back to the edge of the sidewalk 
(Tr. 188). Because the shrubs were overgrown through 
several years of non-pruning, the pruning did expose some dead 
undergrowth ( Tr. 188). Plaintiff admitted on cross examination 
that the 12 to 15 shrubs replaced was in excess of the number 
pruned by defendants (Tr. 161). 
Another significant item was the charge for trash cleanup. 
It is clear from the testimony of plail.tiff that the trash hauled 
included the 12 to 15 shrubs which were removed by plaintiff 
after retaking possession (Tr. 165). Dr. Alder testified on 
behalf of the plaintiff that there was debris in the yard when 
he inspected the property on June 19th (Tr. 131). Plaintiff 
introduced Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 11 which showed garbage piled 
in the yard. Plaintiff variously testified that those pictures 
were taken on June 22nd ( Tr. 145 and 146) and on June 19th 
(Tr. 148). Plaintiff testified that she was responsible for 
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hauling away the garbage shown in Exhibits 8 through 11 
( Tr. 146), but she also admitted that defendants did ac:. 
cleaning subsequent to the time the pictures were taken 
( Tr. 148 and 149) . Defendant Donald Blaine Ridd te;:1 
that valuable possessions were removed on June 19th and: 
all of the garbage depicted in Exhibits 8 through 11 wa~ 
removed by him on June 20th ( Tr. 190). The father of Mr. 
Ridd also testified that he personally helped haul away, 
garbage depicted in Exhibits 8 through 11 ( Tr. 224). 
Three witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant 
that the premises were in better condition on June 20, l! 
than they were when possession was taken on March 10, H: 
( Tr. 204, 207 and 219). Perhaps the most compelling evU 
that the expenditures were primarily for improvements to: 
property comes from plaintiff herself. Plaintiff testifie:I 
cross examination that she had asked $90,500.00 for tbei:I 
property after the defendants had vacated and the expendi:l 
had been made ( Tr. 167) . One of the defendants' witnesse: 
testified that plaintiff had quoted an asking price of 
$91,500.00 ( Tr. 220). 
Plaintiff apparently attempts to duplicate or double! 
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asserted costs of improvements by claiming a diminution in 
~alue of the subject property. Plaintiff apparently claims 
that the premises had a fair market value of $50,000.00 at 
the time she retook possession, resulting in a diminution 
of $7,500.00 (Brief at p. 5). Such an assertion can find no 
support in the record. On cross examination defendant Donald 
Blaine Ridd did testify that the property could be sold for 
$50,000.00 in the same sense that it could also be sold for 
$20,000.00 (Tr. 199). However, he also testified that upon 
his departure the property was worth a substantial amount more 
than $57,SOO.OO (Tr. 225). The plaintiff produced no monetary 
evidence whatsoever of any diminished fair market value. In any 
event, a diminution in fair market value would represent a 
duplication of the figures given by plaintiff for the making 
of improvements. The plaintiff certainly cannot measure damage 
by diminution in fair market value and then add to that the 
cost of any supposed restoration or improvement. 
The plahtiff erroneously characterizes this claimed 
diminution as " loss of bargain " ( Brief at p. 5). There is 
absolutely no testimony which would support such a claim for 
loss of an advantageous bargaining. Loss of an advantageous 
bargain results in this context when a property is sold for an 
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amount in excess of its then fair market value. ( See Co: 
_,_ 
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300P.2d 623 ( 1956), where thee~. 
found the loss of an advantageous bargain within the mea: 
of Perkins v. Spencer. In that case the buyer agreed to: 
double the value of the real estate.) In this case the 
plaintiff responded on cross examination that the fair ::i.f 
value of the property at the time of sale to the defenda: 
was $57, 500. 00 ( Tr. 165). That figure is also the contr: 
price ( Exh. 1) . Furthermore, to determine whether the i~ 
claimed the loss of an advantageous bargain, defendants4 
in Interrogatory No. 7 as to the fair market value of th1 
subject property on the date of contract. The plaintiff': 
response was $57,500.00 ( R. 30). 
E. ATTORNEY' FEE 
Four Utah cases bear on the issue of an attorney's;,, 
The case of Jacobson IT· Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294,I 
( 1954), was an unlawful detainer action where the underi~) 
I f' Uniform Real Esta te Contract provided for an attorney 5 · 
In denying the seller an attorney's fee, this Court said: 
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" Plaintiffs are not entitled to reco11er attorney's 
fees. In Forrester v. Cook the contract pro11ided 
the same as here that the purchaser agreed to pay 
all costs and expenses'which may arise from enforc-
ing this agreement, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee.' 
"There we held that an action in unlawful detainer 
was to enforce the right given by statute and not 
to enforce the provision of the contract. Under this 
decision the only part of this judgment in plaintiffs' 
favor is to award them possession of the property and 
damages for holding over. This case is governed by that 
decision" 
The case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206, 
213 ( 1930), in11olved a real estate contract with language 
nearly identical to that of the current Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. In an unlawful detainer action, this Court held 
as follows: 
"The contract between the parties hereto pro11ides 
for an attorney's fee in ' enforcing this agreement.' 
This is not an action to enforce the agreement. Plaintiff 
has proceeded upon the theory that the agreement fixed 
the status of the parties after forfeiture and that 
thereupon defendants became tenants at will. Upon the 
giving of the notice required by the statute this 
tenancy ceased,and thereafter defendants held possession 
of the premises unlawfully. The action is summary and 
limited and is one for reco11ery of possession of 
property and damages because of the unlawful detention. 
No attempt is made to enforce any of the pro11isions of 
the contract. The action is not one on contract. The 
law and not the contract fixes the measure of damages. 
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No provision is made in the law for an attorney's 
fee in this sort of action." 
In Johnson v. Carman the Court did affirm a case 
which included an offset of $1,165.00 for an attorney's 
However, it nrost be recognized that the Johnson "· Carrr.: 
t 
was not an unlawful detainer action. In that case suit ·o: 
brought by the contract buyer. 
This case was and is an unlawful detainer action oi:J 
by the plaintiff with a counterclaim by the defendants.:: 
the case law it is clear that the plaintiff is entitledil 
offset for an attorney's fee in prosecuting this unlawfu: 
detainer action. In this regard it should be noted that: 
plaintiff retook possession on June 20, 1979 ( Tr. 127 anl 
shortly after the Complaint was filed on June 12, 1979 ! I 
Upon retaking possession, the plaintiff would undoubted!:• 
been content to dismiss the entire lawsuit. This point •~ii 
clear at the time of trial when plaintiff's counsel waivd 
claim to treble damages and any reliance upon notices pur:l 
given ( Tr. 127). However, the plaintiff was unable to di~ 
her Complaint because the defendants filed an Answer and 
1 
claim on June 15, 1979 ( R. 13). It is submittedthatpla:> 
is entitled to no attorney's fee for defending against 
defendants' Counterclaim. 
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In any event, the trial court has discretion in awarding 
attorney's fees. In F\illmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976), the plaintiff-vendor brought an action to quiet title 
and to declare forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
In that case the trial court held for the plaintiff but failed 
to award attorney's fees. The Fullmer case differs from the 
case at issue because in this case the defendants prevailed on 
the merits and there is consequently less justification for 
awarding plahtiff an attorney's fee. In holding that the 
plaintiff-vendor was not entitled to an attorney's fee this 
Court used the following language: 
"The final issue to be considered is the plaintiffs' 
contention by way of cross-appeal, that the trial 
court erred in refusing to award attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the terms of the uniform real estate 
contract .... A suit of this nature involving 
invocation of a forfeiture and/or the enforcement of 
the 
In 
that 
a purchase contract invokes consideration of the 
principles of equity which address themselves to 
conscience and discretion of the trial court .... 
view of these circumstances we are not pursuaded 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to require defendant to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's 
fees." 
546 P. 2d at 610 
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CONCIDSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court1s 
decision is supported by facts in e11idence and by the wel: 
recognized decisions of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Or11al C. Harrison 
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